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Book Review
GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL POLICY: ENSURING
MEDICINES FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD
Frederick M. Abbott & Graham Dukes
Pharmaceuticals play a central role in health care throughout the
world. The pharmaceutical industry is beset with difficulties as increasing
research and development expenditure yields fewer new treatments. Public
and private budgets strain under the weight of high prices and limited ac-
cess. The world's poor see little effort to address diseases prevalent in less
affluent societies, while the world's wealthy are overusing prescription
drugs, risking their health and wasting resources.
As the global economic crisis exacerbates pressure on health care
budgets, a new presidential administration in Washington, DC has com-
mitted to broad health care reform. These circumstances form the back-
drop for this extraordinarily timely examination of the global system for
the development, production, distribution and use of medicines. The au-
thors are acknowledged experts in the fields of pharmaceutical law and
policy, with many years experience advising governments, multilateral or-
ganizations and policy-makers on issues involving innovation, access and
use of medicines. Supported by a team of independent scientists, doctors
and lawyers, they take an insightful look at the issues surrounding global
regulation of the pharmaceutical sector, and offer pragmatic suggestions
for reform.
This book will be of interest to government policy-makers, members
of industry, healthcare professionals, teachers, students and lawyers in the
fields of public health, intellectual property and international trade.
* Frederick M. Abbott is the Edward Ball Eminent Scholar Professor of International Law at Florida State
University College of Law, USA and Graham Dukes, Physician and Lawyer, is External Professor of Drug
Policy Studies at the Institute of General Practice and Community Health (Section for International Health),
University of Oslo, Norway.
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GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: ENSURING
PROFITS AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC HEALTH
Reviewer: David Szostak
INTRODUCTION
The pharmaceutical industry has two remarkably different faces. It
portrays itself as altruistic and innovative, spending a fortune on research
and development to create breakthrough medicines that cure all manner of
diseases, alleviating the suffering of humanity. On the flip side, its critics
paint the industry as greedy and callous, charging exorbitant prices for
life-saving drugs while generally ignoring the poor altogether. Global
Pharmaceutical Policy lays out a large number of problems in the phar-
maceutical industry and various governmental policies that attempt to deal
with the industry in an optimal way. The problems run the gamut from
excessive use of medication by the rich to the lack of access to drugs by
the poor, and from the patent system allowing for market exclusivity by
originator drug companies to government subsidies of research and ge-
neric drugs. The authors, Abbott and Dukes, do an excellent job of bring-
ing innumerable problems to light. Their solutions and recommendations,
however, are modest and overly optimistic, and they fall drastically short
of what is necessary to remedy the situation.
The problems with global pharmaceutical policy are too numerous to
list in full here, but a number of them are worth mentioning. There is no
single, unified worldwide policy when it comes to either promoting inno-
vation or regulation in pharmaceuticals. The authors refer to it as "re-
markably disjointed" because each country has its own policies and does
whatever it wants.' Research and development (R&D) is not coordinated
globally very well. Furthermore, the large-scale economic decisions of
what exactly to produce and where to supply it are made by a handful of
executives seeking, primarily1 greater profits and not the greater social
good or health of populations.
** David Szostak is a third year law student at DePaul University College of Law. He is a Fellow in the
DePaul Health Law Institute, Executive Text Editor on the Editorial Board for the DePaul Journal of Health
Care Law, and a J.D./M.B.A. candidate (2010) at DePaul University College of Law and Kellstadt Gradu-
ate School of Business.
I Frederick M. Abbott & Graham Dukes, Global Pharmaceutical Policy: Ensuring Medicines for Tomor-
row's World, I (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009).
2 Id.
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A wide gap also exists between the rich and the poor among different
countries and also within the same countries. There are many pharmaceu-
ticals that the rich can afford but the poor cannot. R&D is unimpressive:
rates of innovation are "surprisingly low."3 Since corporate profits dictate
everything, companies invest far less in diseases of the poor because, of
course, the poor have no money which with to buy the drugs.4
The authors argue that the global pharmaceutical industry is ex-
tremely complex, and no single solution exists for the many challenges
that societies face. It is true that the situation is complex, but the danger of
overcomplicated and nuanced solutions is that truly helpful remedies get
diluted and watered down. As the current patchwork of a health care re-
form bill that Congress has been debating for many months demonstrates,
shooting for modest reform often results in a trivial change, if any. Why
not, at least at the outset, aim for a more ideal solution?
PROBLEMS
The book opens by confronting the many challenges that plague the
pharmaceutical industry and the policies that govern it. A powerful in-
dictment of the industry sets the tone of the rest of the book: "In 2007 total
worldwide revenues from sales of pharmaceutical products amounted to
approximately $650 billion, of which $550 billion went to the originator
companies and $100 billion to the generic companies." Large corpora-
tions have spent a lot of money on advertising and information campaigns
to convince the public that their R&D efforts have been highly successful,
but in reality they have a very low success rate. It is "decidedly low" and
not "well attuned to actual needs."6
Why the low rate of innovation currently? A number of reasons are
possibilities: (1) Perverse incentives are abundant. Companies that create
"new" drugs are rewarded highly for just making minor changes to previ-
ously patented drugs. This extends the life of their monopolies and is low-
risk but very profitable. (2) "The low-hanging fruit of pharmaceutical in-
novation already has been plucked."7 Companies have already done the
easiest stuff. (3) The whole industry has been consolidating of the past
few decades, with a result of fewer opportunities pursued; fewer minds are
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 2.
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id.
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working on fewer projects in fewer labs. (4) There is a disconnect be-
tween university research labs and actually transforming new medicines
into marketable products. Solutions to these problems include proposals
to reform patent laws to remove the perverse incentives, use prizes to fo-
cus innovation on specific diseases, and expand government subsidies to
R&D (and invest it more wisely).
Other problems pervading the field are a severe lack of access to
medicines in developing countries, extremely misleading marketing and
promotion, and a lack of R&D in diseases that plague poor people because
they are simply not profitable.9  Additionally, health care costs in the
United States and Western Europe are spiraling out of control.' 0
Perhaps the most disturbing question is simply one of profit. Glob-
ally, annually, $100 billion is spent on R&D, and another $137 billion on
total costs of production for pharmaceuticals. This, however, is only a
combined $237 billion out of $550 billion price tag for original products,
so where is the other $313 billion going?l2 Whether it creates high execu-
tive salaries, dividends for stockholders, or enriches the wealthy in some
other way, it is one of the largest problems in the health care sector. It is
no wonder health care premiums have been increasing so rapidly for so
many years; the insurance companies are paying the pharmaceutical indus-
try astronomical sums, from which it profits considerably. The depth of
this problem is explored more later in this review.
INNOVATION
The authors spend several chapters of Global Pharmaceutical Policy
discussing innovation: how to promote it and what policies are best. This
is a worthy topic because new breakthrough drugs are rare; the patent sys-
tem is supposed to encourage investment and development, but most pat-
ents for new drugs are similar to existing drugs.' 3 The reason is simply
profit. Corporations must remain profitable, so their officers make deci-
sions based on profit, and it is a much safer bet to slightly modify current,
well-researched drugs than to try anything truly innovative and brand
14
new.
8 Id. at 4.
9 Id. at 8.
1 OId. at 12.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 13.
13 Id. at 17.
14 Id. at 18.
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The current patent-based system is deeply flawed. Exclusive market-
ing and patent rights allow originator drug companies to charge 10-20
times more for same drug that a generic producer could manufacture and
sell for much less.' 5 This might be justified, in theory, if the originator
companies were producing revolutionary breakthroughs in treatment, but
this is rarely the case. Instead, originators abuse the system by "ever-
greening" their patents and their marketing exclusivity by slightly modify-
ing the old drug (e.g., increasing the potency and changing the instructions
to take it fewer times per day) and getting a new patent on it.16 As the au-
thors note, "the desire for financial gain can motivate otherwise reasonable
people to take shortcuts that can wreak havoc with public health."l 7 This
is a candid and common sense statement, but our entire healthcare system
is based on the free market and the desire for financial gain. The essential
problem with Global Pharmaceutical Policy is that the authors do not
carry their arguments to their logical conclusion or elaborate on their im-
plications.
The patent-based system has both positive and negative aspects. On
the one hand, it supposedly provides lots of R&D investment;' 8 it provides
opportunities for large financial reward, which in turn create innovation;' 9
20
and patents are temporary and limited, and many regions are patent-free.
On the other hand, however, the level of innovation is low because of the
phenomenon of evergreening; investment only occurs in diseases that will
be extremely profitable; the whole system "is profit oriented, not public
health oriented;" and R&D funding goes to whatever is most profitable,
e.g., cosmetics and erectile dysfunction, but for diseases like sleeping
sickness, a huge public health issue, no research takes place.
The authors then propose three goals for reforming the system of
R&D and distribution of pharmaceuticals: (1) improve the yield of break-
through products; (2) bring prices of new drugs under control, both for the
benefit of the poor and for public health budgets spiraling out of control;
22
and (3) increase R&D for neglected diseases. The three potential ap-
proaches to furthering innovation are the patent-based system, subsidies,
15 Id. at 19.
16 Id. at 20.
17 Id. at 22.
18 Id. at 28.
19 Id. at 30.
20 Id. at 31.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 33-34.
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or targeted prizes. The authors explain the patent process in detail, pre-
senting a clear description of the criteria an invention must meet, and they
suggest ways to alter the existing system, such as creating a tiered patent
system or quasi-patents, essentially patents with weaker protections. 23
One interesting proposal is that courts could also allow (as they do in some
other countries) an infringing party to continue to infringe (rather than is-
sue an injunction to stop), while simply requiring that the party pay the
originator company a royalty. Furthermore, the government could choose
24to fix a specific royalty rate or not. This is a creative solution that would
allow the patent-holding companies to be reimbursed for the infringement
so their profits are not drastically slashed, but at the same time it would al-
low generic drug companies to produce much-needed drugs, permitting
wider access to medicines for entire populations.
A complete alternative to patents would be a subsidy system, in
which the government gives a grant to do research or even develop a drug.
As the authors astutely note, "why not spend the money on specifically
targeted public health priorities? Why leave questions about the direction
of R&D to the market?" 25 The whole current system is premised on the
idea that the market is efficient and innovative, and the direction of R&D
on pharmaceuticals should proceed according to whatever the market dic-
tates. In practical terms, of course, this means that diseases of the poor -
no matter how ravaging, debilitating, fatal, or widespread - are largely ne-
glected; the poor have no money to pay for medicines even if a cure is
found. Instead, the industry caters to the wealthy, addressing problems
such as baldness and erectile dysfunction because people with money care
about these afflictions. The alternative approach would be for society to
decide, via governmental and regulatory decisions, that certain widespread
diseases should be targeted to develop a treatment or cure, and money
should be allocated to do R&D in that specific area, regardless of profit-
ability.
Critics of this approach argue that subsidy recipients may be ineffi-
cient or lazy; that government officials do not know enough to evaluate
proposals and choose the best research leads; and that favoritism and cor-
26
ruption plague governmental decisions. These are poor arguments. The
appropriate governmental agency could simply retain disinterested experts
23 Id. at 37.
24 Id. at 38.
25 Id. at 45.
26 Id. at 45.
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who know as much about research leads as anyone in the private sector,
and it could attract such experts by paying adequate, competitive salaries.
As for inefficiency or laziness, this is largely a myth. As the authors note,
"some of the great scientific successes of the Western world have resulted
from government subsidized research projects" like NASA projects,
DARPA and the Internet, military projects (e.g., GPS), Airbus in Europe,
27
and many others.
Essentially, an alternative system could involve substantial govern-
ment funding for universities and institutions that develop new pharma-
ceuticals, with research targeted on diseases that the government (instead
of the market) deems important. Once produced, these medicines could be
sold at low cost as generics instead of as high-priced, name-brand patented
drugs.
The authors also discuss a prize system as a third alternative to spur
innovation, which is certainly worth further study. The bottom line,
though, is that the current system is creating a very low rate of innovation
and is just plain not working. They conclude "certainly more needs to be
done - and at a fairly large scale. Market-based solutions cannot be used
to address the needs of people who have no meaningful basis for market
participation." 28 The problem with Global Pharmaceutical Policy is its
basic refusal to follow through on its observations with viable solutions.
While its observations about the current broken system are entirely accu-
rate, the book hesitates to thoroughly condemn the market despite the
market's clear responsibility for so many problems.
Patent law is used as a blunt instrument to protect drug companies'
profits. An illustrative example involves the cancer drug, Taxol. The U.S.
government, through the National Institutes of Health (NIH), spent an
enormous amount of money on R&D for this drug: from 1977 to 2002,29NIH invested a total of $484 million. Yet the government chose to li-
cense Taxol to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS). BMS's sales of Taxol to-
taled over $9 billion from 1993 to 2002 alone; BMS agreed to pay NIH
30
royalties of a mere 0.5 percent, totaling $35 million. The National Can-
cer Institute actually waived its right to set prices for Taxol, and BMS is
27 Id. at 46.
28 Id. at 58-59.
29 Technology Transfer: NIH-Private Sector Partnership in the Development of Taxol, United States Gen-
eral Accounting Office, Report to the Honorable Ron Wyden, U.S. Senate (June 2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03829.pdf.
30 Id.
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not required to disclose its costs of development.3 1 BMS sold Taxol for
$4.87 per milligram, more than eight times the government's manufactur-
32ing cost of sixty cents.
Pharmaceutical companies are using patents to their advantage, and to
the disadvantage of public health generally. On the one hand, they have
legal protection for their astronomical profits, and they often do not even
have to conduct the initial R&D to begin with. Often the government sub-
sidizes the research, but the pharmaceutical corporations get a license for
the results and market an incredibly profitable drug. On the other hand,
the typical argument in favor of patents is that they at least encourage in-
novation, but as we can see from the present low rate of innovation and the
insidious technique of 'evergreening' that this rationale is not so strong af-
ter all. What is necessary is a much larger system of government subsidies
for R&D, with the end result of selling generics at low cost, and simulta-
neously an abolition of the patent system for pharmaceuticals. Medicines,
vital for health and life, should not be subject to patent.
The U.S. Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association of
America (PhRMA) seems to convey the impression that it devotes an im-
mense sum of money to R&D. In practice, however, its expenses consist
of about 36 percent on manufacturing, 24 percent on marketing, and a
mere 16 percent on R&D.33 The authors point out a number of serious
problems with the current pharmaceutical industry, all seemingly unre-
lated. In the U.S., the wealthiest nation in the world, up to 90 million peo-
ple lack access to prescription drugs, an appallingly high number.34 Glob-
ally, the richest 15 percent of the world's population consumes 91 percent
of all medicines.35 And a massive wasteful duplication of effort exists be-
cause many companies create new knowledge, but they refuse share it with
36
each other or with the public; data are secret. What do these ostensibly
unconnected problems have in common? The profit system: that is, capi-
talism.
Both in the U.S. and globally, there is a huge gap between the rich
and the poor, and even in the wealthiest regions, the poor either cannot af-
ford or lack access to medicines. Furthermore, the idea that knowledge
31 Ralph Nader, The Ralph Nader reader 164 (Seven Stories Press 2000).
32 Id.
33 Abbott & Dukes, supra note 1, at 67.
34 Id. at 66.
35 Id.
36 Id.
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can be protected, patented, and made secret is antithetical to the very no-
tion of science, which requires open sharing of knowledge and collabora-
tion among scientists. While the authors are right to point out a number of
inequalities and problems that plague the current system, they will not go
so far as to blame the free market.
Instead, what the book recommends for general principles for policy
development in biotechnology is a prospective, anticipatory approach:
supplement existing law, assist developing countries that lack resources,
reconsider the role of animal studies (since biotechnology is fundamen-
tally different from older chemical drugs), reconsider drugs' priorities in
the review process in regulatory agencies, ensure the public has access to
information and some degree of input, etc. 37
None of these recommendations will solve the fundamental problems
that the profit system is causing when it comes to vast inequalities in
wealth and access to drugs, low rates of innovation in PhRMA, and secre-
tive information. Nor do the authors explain how any of these things,
which directly contradict and cut into corporate profits, can actually be
done. Certainly the public should have access to information and should
have a degree of input - but how? Leaving the patent system intact - in
fact, leaving PhRMA intact as a whole - rules out any possibility of sub-
stantial openness and sharing of scientific data and knowledge, among sci-
entists or among the public. Legislators and regulatory agencies can le-
gally require companies disclose data, but, as we will see later, when it is
more profitable to violate the law and pay a small fine, companies have no
real incentive to disclose.
GLOBAL REGULATION
Global Pharmaceutical Policy devotes much time to discussing the
global regulatory environment, primarily focusing on quality, safety, and
efficacy of drugs. As the authors point out, 'caveat emptor' (let the buyer
beware) is of little value when it comes to consumer protection in medi-
cines because the patient is totally unable to judge the quality or safety of
the drug, and she often cannot figure out whether the drug is effective,
even after taking it.38 This is an important issue. Adverse drug reactions
are one of the leading causes of death in the U.S.
39
37 Id. at 80-82.
38 Id. at 86.
39 Id. at 93.
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Drug policy and regulation is extremely complex, but overall, the
book asserts, the system works well: "Malpractice, misjudgment, exces-
sive enrichment and dishonest behavior all occur, but the system accom-
modates and corrects the individual fault, and policies are progressively
adjusted to counter undesirable trends."40 This is, at best, wishful think-
ing. Such an assertion makes it sounds as if excessive enrichment is the
exception rather than the rule. Dishonest behavior and enrichment are not
only tolerated, they are in fact encouraged in the current system. The un-
desirable trends seem to be accumulating in number, and policies are not
being adjusted to counter them in any way.
One of the biggest concerns is the lack of transparency and confiden-
tiality of data, as noted briefly above. Regulators who review clinical trial
and research data are bound to secrecy; confidentiality is assured and pro-
tected by law. Courts and government agencies broadly interpret and ap-
ply confidentiality provisions. 4 1 However, from the public's point of view,
or that of the medical profession, openness is crucial: if a drug is causing
adverse effects, all relevant data, studies, and reports must be available for
scientific and public scrutiny.42 This creates a fundamental contradiction
because the law is jealously guarding pharmaceutical profits by ensuring
data remain secret, yet public health and science demand open sharing of
knowledge. Once again, the market is at the root of the problem, and any
reform will pale in comparison to the staggering power of corporate prof-
its.
THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Perhaps the most important part of the book, a chapter is devoted to
medicines in the developing world. The authors list a few important gen-
eral points: (1) medicines and vaccines are the most widely used tool for
prevention and relief of disease; (2) a very large proportion of world's
population still has little or no access to medicines; the situation remains
catastrophic as more than 10 million children die every year, mainly in de-
veloping countries, from preventable or curable diseases; and (3) the inter-
national community has generall assumed the task of providing relief and
support to developing countries.
40 Id. at 87.
41 Id. at 103-04.
42 Id. at 104.
43 Id. at 116.
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Particularly compelling is the U.N. Task Force assertion that "the lack
of life-saving and health-supporting medicines for an estimated 2 billion
poor people stands as a direct contradiction to the fundamental principle of
health as a human right."44 The Task Force has it right, albeit as an under-
statement: this is an inconsistency - and truly a crime - of global propor-
tions. The direct contradiction here is between the rich and the poor, and
neither will it resolve itself over time, nor will gradual reforms solve it.
Lives are hanging in the balance today; people around the world are enti-
tled to demand their fundamental human rights immediately, not decades
in the future. Drastic and urgent action is necessary.
Of course, three members of U.N. Task Force who represented multi-
national drug companies had irreconcilable disagreements with the major-
ity of the Task Force members, who all had backgrounds in public
45health. This is a poignant microcosm, representative of what is wrong
with the global pharmaceutical system today: profit-seeking corporations
cannot co-exist with humane public health policy. The differences among
the members of this Task Force are illustrative of the wider differences be-
tween the pharmaceutical industry as a whole and the regulatory agencies
and governments attempting to maintain a public health system.
Some interesting statistics that the authors bring to light relate to Af-
rica, where widespread poverty exists. Sub-Saharan Africa has more than
10 percent of the world's population but accounts for barely over 1 percent
of the world's drug market; moreover, to really drive the point home, a
cow in Europe is subsidized at $2 a day (in Japan, $4 a day), while 50 per-
cent of Africans live on less than $1 daily income.47 This demonstrates
where the priorities of the developed nations lie.
As an example of how easily the wealthy nations (or even the phar-
maceutical industry) could greatly alleviate suffering in Africa: $2 per
person per year is sufficient to provide everyone with a basic package of
essential medicines (a mere $1.4 billion per year for all of sub-Saharan Af-
rica), while the world's commercial drug market, in contrast, has revenues
48
of $700 billion a year, a substantial fraction of which is profit. It is en-
tirely reasonable to argue, as many people have, that large drug companies
44 Id. at 117 (citing Prescriptions for Healthy Development: Increasing Access to Medicines (2005), Task
Force for the United Nations Millennium Project).
45 Id. at 119.
46 Id. at 118.
47 Id.
48Id. at 119.
2010] 113
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 13.1:103
are responsible for millions of deaths worldwide as they price their drugs
out of reach of the poor while simultaneously fighting generic drug manu-
facturers tooth and nail to stay out of their markets.
Finally, the authors discuss a number of problems common to many
developing countries when it comes to public drug procurement and drug
management, as well as a general lack of public drug information and edu-
cation. One seemingly insurmountable problem is simply the lack of phy-
sicians and pharmacists in developing countries: "For every 100,000 popu-
lation, Australia has some 250 physicians and 70 pharmacists. For an
equivalent population sample, Senegal has only five physicians and one
half-time pharmacist." 49 This is an appallingly large gap and not easily
solved. The authors recommend some guidelines for the people prescrib-
ing and dispensing medicines in these countries (since the majority of
them are not fully trained or educated in prescribing practices), as well as
public information campaigns via radio and posters.
Another problem, though it may seem odd at first glance, is inappro-
priate donations: charities or large corporations may donate medicines that
are poorly prepared, expired, useless, or that have no disposal plan, either
in good faith or in bad faith. 0 An article in the New England Journal of
Medicine in 1998 pointed to abusive bad-faith drug donations in Bosnia
and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1996. Its authors estimated that over 50
percent of the drugs that entered these two nations during this time period
52
were inappropriate. In 1999, the WHO and Pharmaciens sans Frontiares
(Pharmacists without Borders) concluded that Western pharmaceutical
companies had dumped tons of unusable and expired drugs in Albania for
the Kosovo relief effort.53 A number of years later, in the wake of the
2004 tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands in Southeast Asia, the
same organization concluded that the quality of the drug donation system
had not improved; in fact, it had deteriorated.54 The drugs caused addi-
tional health problems for the population, and they are extremely costly to
dispose of.
49 Id. at 126.
50 Id. at 131.
51 R. Aplenc et al., Inappropriate Drug-Donation Practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 338 (20) New
Eng. J. Med. 1472 (1998).
52 Id.
53 Study on Drug Donations in the Province of Aceh in Indonesia, Pharmaciens sans Frontibres 1 (Nov.
2005) available at http://www.acfid.asn.aulwhat-we-do/docs-what-we-do/does-humanitarian-and-
emergencies/does tsunami/drugdonationsaceh.pdf.
54 Id. at 5.
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Sometimes a charity or company donates useless or expired drugs in
good faith, not realizing that the medicines are useless at best and might
actually harm people. However, it is a much more sinister, and yet legal,
practice for large pharmaceutical corporations to dump such drugs into de-
veloping nations simply to avoid the disposal costs while simultaneously
reaping tax benefits of donations, as well as the enhanced public image.
While there are numerous other major problems with the healthcare
systems, and more specifically, pharmaceutical policies, in developing
countries, the most effective solution and pressing need right now is that
these countries simply need money: their research facilities are poorly
funded, and their people have little or no access to medicines. They also
need information, such as libraries of compounds and biological materials,
in order to conduct research.55 As Abbott and Dukes put it, the "key point
is relatively straightforward. Most of the impediments to improving local
production of pharmaceuticals in developing countries can be addressed
by increasing the financial resources made available."56 It is a question of
money: the gap between the rich and the poor countries across the globe is
exacerbating the healthcare situation, as well as the pharmaceutical indus-
try's progress. The drive to accumulate as much wealth as possible is
causing massive suffering and death; this situation is intolerable.
INFORMATION AND ADVERTISING
Another main theme of this expansive book is its in-depth discussion
of education, information, and - in stark contrast to these two things -
what the authors refer to as persuasion (promotion or advertising). Educa-
tion, for its part, is largely lacking; the public suffers from a number of
common misunderstandings when it comes to medicines, such as believing
that two doses are more effective than one, while some other people are
afraid to take any medicines at all.57 At least we can rely on physicians to
know what they are doing, though, right? Apparently not: for one thing,
the pharmaceutical industry largely finances postgraduate medical educa-
tion, which implies a dangerous level of bias, while at the same time,
"most medical schools still lack a formal course in clinical pharmacology,
and physicians, pharmacists and other scientists in training may not have
access to formal teaching of this subject."58 Physicians often never have a
55 Abbott & Dukes, supra note 1, at 147.
56 Id. at 142.
57 Id. at 168.
58 Id. at 169.
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chance to learn rational prescribing practices, and any gaps in knowledge
are subsequently filled by the pharmaceutical industry, which is not ex-
actly a neutral party.
Information is also limited, even for physicians. While thousands of
medical journals exist that could conceivably provide doctors with infor-
mation about prescribing drugs, there are multiple practical limitations: (1)
very few truly authoritative and impartial journals are produced, with fully
peer-reviewed studies (e.g., The Lancet), and the developing world has
nothing like these at all; (2) studies of drugs are scattered across hundreds
of medical journals, some of which are not reputable; and (3) lastly, some
journals have become highly dependent on the pharmaceutical industry for
income, putting their credibility at risk.59 As a result of all this, physicians
end up with very little knowledge about correct prescribing procedures for
different people, even for old and relatively well-known drugs. For exam-
ple, doctors must prescribe different doses for people who have liver prob-
lems, and these doses differ for hundreds of drugs, something which no
physician could possibly memorize, and many do not even realize. Fur-
thermore, knowledge about new and relatively untested drugs is even
scarcer.
The largest segment of this section, however, is devoted to persua-
sion, or commercial advertising, which often counts for more than the ac-
tual merits of the drug.60 Heavy promotion, however, is highly problem-
atic. Decades ago, industry representatives used to merely convey
documented information; today they are high pressure salespeople, often
termed 'drug consultants.' 6 1 These people are an incredibly powerful
promotional weapon for pharmaceutical companies; moreover, it is very
difficult to regulate messages that drug consultants convey to prescribing
physicians: they may promote unauthorized uses for drugs, gloss over
problems, or employ any number of deceptive tactics.
To make matters worse, as is well known, drug companies offer doc-
tors gifts, lunches, trips, and other inducements for listening to their drug
consultants or other paid speakers.62 The Pew Prescription Project has
found that the pharmaceutical industry spends more than $7 billion per
year on free gifts, meals, travel, speaking fees, and other benefits to per-
59 Id. at 171-72.
60 Id. at 175.
61 Id. at 179.
62 Id. at 180.
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suade physicians to prescribe their drugs.63 Moreover, in 2005, the same
organization found that the pharmaceutical industry spends at least $18
billion on free samples for doctors' offices per year. While the authors
advocate reform, this system is clearly going to continue, with its multi-
tude of serious problems, as long as the drug industry remains privatized.
Only a nationalization of the pharmaceutical industry, rendering it com-
pletely non-profit, could finally and permanently solve these evils, to the
immeasurable benefit of public health.
The practice of advertising prescription drugs directly to the public
exists only in the United States and New Zealand. In contrast, in most
developed countries, only over the counter (OTC) drugs can be advertised
to the public; prescription drugs can only be advertised to physicians be-
66
cause it is thoroughly unnecessary to expose the public to them. The
pharmaceutical industry, which aggressively lobbied to expand its adver-
tising rights in the U.S. in the past few decades, argues in favor of direct to
consumer advertising for several reasons: (1) it creates consumer pressure
on prescribers, who react by ensuring they have relevant info on the drug
and are thus well-informed; (2) the doctor-patient relationship will be im-
proved because of increased contact and discussion; (3) earlier knowledge
of treatment options will ease anxiety about disease risk; (4) it leads to bet-
ter patient outcomes because medicines will be used to treat diseases ear-
lier; (5) a prohibition on ads would keep patients in the dark; that is, ads
increase the likelihood that patients will consult the doctor; and (6) it fos-
67ters innovation for new medicines. While these arguments could each be
individually analyzed, the obvious true reason that the industry supports
direct to consumer advertising is because it dramatically increases drug
sales when patients have heard of specific drugs and ask for them by
name. Profits drive this, as they drive every decision and corporate stance
in this industry.
Of course, critics have their counter-arguments against direct to con-
sumer advertising: (1) it leads to inappropriate use of medicines because
doctors cave in to patient pressure; (2) it undermines the doctor-patient re-
63 Press Release (2007), National Physicians Alliance join forces to stem negative influence of marketing
on health care, Pew Prescription Project, Oct. 19, available at http://www.prescriptionproject.
org/news/pressreleases?id=0010.
64 Press Release (2008), New survey highlights drug samples' role as marketing tool, Pew Prescription
Project, Jan. 3, available at http://www.prescriptionproject.org/news/pressreleases?id=0011.
65 Id. at 183.
66 Id. at 183-84.
67 Id. at 185.
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lationship because patients may demand a specific drug and leave their
doctor if she refuses to prescribe it; (3) it results in confused or misin-
formed consumers; (4) it generates consumer anxiety through exaggerated
promotion of risk of disease; (5) medicines are widely used before their
risks are fully known; (6) it promotes a view of medicines as complete so-
lutions, rather than diet and exercise; and (7) 8patients will 'doctor shop' to
find doctors who will prescribe medicines. Unlike the pharmaceutical
industry's arguments, these claims have at least a rebuttable presumption
of validity because there is no suspicious profit motive behind them.
COURTS AND LITIGATION
Since this is a book not just about pharmaceuticals, but rather about
policies for dealing with them including national regulation and litigation,
it is fitting that a segment of Global Pharmaceutical Policy is devoted to
the role of the courts. Lawsuits serve an important public purpose in
bringing otherwise hidden information to light, and they keep drug com-
panies in check. However, because of the sheer profits involved, even the
prospect of a massive settlement or judgment is not too large a deterrent.
In one notable case, in 2005, Eli Lilly paid out $700 million in a set-
tlement for 8,000 cases filed against it because its anti-psychotic drug,
Zyprexa, caused diabetes; however, the drug's annual sales remained at
69$4.4 billion in 2006. Such massive lawsuit judgments and settlements
are only a small fraction of the drug's sales in a single year. From the per-
spective of the pharmaceutical corporations, the benefits to putting a prof-
itable drug on the market, even if it is risky and may injure or even kill
people, vastly outweigh the costs. In fact, a company will sometimes hide
negative information from the regulatory agency, like the FDA, in order to
get approval; 70 the billions in revenue will outweigh even the sanctions for
violating the law, and that illegal activity may never be exposed, anyway.
Companies are more than willing to gamble.
The authors spend a good deal of time discussing (and criticizing) the
idea that when a regulatory agency approves a drug, the company that cre-
ated it should have a safe harbor or immunity from private lawsuits when
the drug later turns out to injure people; this principle is more concisely
referred to as pre-emption of tort lawsuits. In the United States, such pre-
68 Id. at 185-86.
69 Id. at 194.
70 Id. at 198.
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emption and immunity for drug companies is largely the case in the state
courts, although the Supreme Court rejected this approach in 2009; in
other countries, the authorities' registration and approval of a drug does
not abolish liability.7 1 In Michigan, for example, since 2006, if the FDA
approves a drug, consumers cannot sue for defective warning or defective
design unless the manufacturer obtained approval by omitting or fraudu-
72lently misrepresenting information.
The authors, for their part, argue that "broad acceptance of pre-
emption in the pharmaceutical area would run seriously counter to the
public interest" because the civil litigation process serves the public inter-
est, bringing significant facts to light. The litigation process itself often
uncovers a lot of private, secret information, such as adverse results from a
clinical trial or internal company memos. One entirely typical illustration
of the useful role litigation can play is when it uncovered that Pfizer, the
manufacturer of the anti-inflammatory drug Celebrex, had conducted an
unpublished clinical study in 1999 to determine whether the drug could
treat Alzheimer's disease, and the study found an increased incidence in
heart attacks - but Pfizer delayed submission of the study to the FDA until
2001. 74 Thus, the label carried no warning for this, and innumerable peo-
ple were severely injured or killed as a result. Had litigation been pre-
empted because of FDA approval, this unpublished study may have easily
never surfaced.
Similarly, Merck knew that Vioxx caused an increased risk of heart
attack, and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) knew that Paxil, an antidepressant,
increased the risk of suicide in children; both companies had internal
memos, emails, and other documents showing clear knowledge, which
they covered up.75  In fact, GSK's memos urged company officials to
'manage the dissemination of data in order to minimize any potential
negative commercial impact' while telling sales reps to tell doctors that
'Paxil demonstrates remarkable efficacy and safety in the treatment of
adolescent depression.' 76
As for Merck, Vioxx is not the only scandal that has plagued the
71 Id. at 202.
72 Id. at 205.
73 Id. at 206.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 207.
76 Id. (citing Press Release (2004), 'Settlement sets new standard for release of drug information', Office
of the NY State Attorney General, 26 August).
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company in recent years. In 2008, Merck and its partner Schering-Plough
belatedly released the results of a company-sponsored study of Zetia, a
cholesterol-lowering drug." The study had been completed in April 2006
and its findings were long withheld; they were only released under pres-
sure from consumer groups, the media, and a federal investigation. The
findings of the study, however, showed that the Zetia does not reduce fatty
arterial plaque that causes heart attacks and strokes. The companies
knew this for years, hiding the information from the public. They also
used false and deceptive marketing techniques to claim that Vytorin was
more effective - and safer - than the much cheaper generic Zocor, another
cholesterol-lowering drug that had been around for a while and had just
recently gone off-patent. In fact, the data suggest that plaque built up in
the arteries of patients on the newer Vytorin at an even faster rate than in
those taking the older Zocor.
The most appalling, and yet entirely predictable, part about this illegal
activity was the profit motive that drove it. Zocor lost its patent protection
in June 2006; Merck and Schering-Plough developed Vytorin to help ex-
tend the profitable life of Zocor (Vytorin is simply a combination of Zetia
and Zocor). Once Zocor went generic, it costs a mere three cents per
pill, in contrast with the $3 per pill the drug companies charged for Vy-
torin. While not discussed in Global Pharmaceutical Policy, this is a per-
fect and very recent demonstration of a number of themes in the book.
Drug companies slightly alter existing drugs just to keep 'evergreening'
their patents rather than develop any true breakthroughs; they grossly
overcharge for patented drugs; often the patented drugs are no better (and
in some cases actually less safe and less effective) than earlier generics;
and the pharmaceutical companies will ruthlessly hide negative results,
cover things up, and lie to the public through advertising. While the au-
thors call for a number of reforms to the patent system, advertising regula-
tions, and other laws, it is really the profit system fueling all these sys-
temic problems.
To be fair, the FDA is not performing its job as guardian of public
health, either. If it were, all the greed of the pharmaceutical industries
could not simply slip past its impenetrable walls, creating dangers for con-
sumers. The pharmaceutical industry pours vast sums of money into the
77 Sophia Pearson, Merck, Schering-Plough Sued Over Zetia, Vytorin Costs, Bloomberg, June 8, 2009.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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FDA to fund its drug approval process, an obvious conflict of interest: ac-
cording to the public health and safety organization Public Citizen, in
2008, the industry gave $400 million to the FDA's drug division, which
funds the salaries of the scientists who review drugs.8
In that case, perhaps not surprisingly, the FDA's own pharmacology
reviewer recommended against approving Vytorin because of test results
that showed serious toxicity in laboratory animals, even with very small
amounts of the drug. The FDA approved it anyway. Because of a lack
of federal funding, the pharmaceutical industry is now paying for more
and more of the FDA's drug evaluations. A New England Journal of
Medicine article from April 2007 documents this sharply increasing trend,
pointing out that, as of 2004, drug companies were paying over 40 percent
83
of the budget for the FDA division that reviews new drug applications.
This brings into question whether the FDA's client is the public or the
pharmaceutical industry. Undoubtedly, this is not a rhetorical question:
the answer is the drug industry.
To sum up, if a drug company does a cost-benefit analysis, it will see
powerful incentives to hide or cover up negative data. If the company is
honest to the regulatory agency and to the public, the drug may never get
approved and cannot be sold at all, or even if approved, the public may be
so frightened by its severe side effects that the company loses billions of
dollars in sales. However, if the PhRMA corporation hides or alters nega-
tive data, at most it will lose a few hundred million dollars to settlements,
judgments, or criminal fines and sanctions, and that is only if it is sued or
prosecuted in the first place, which may well never happen. Even if it
happens, though, the pharmaceutical company will still earn billions of
dollars per year in sales, more than enough to make up for any losses. The
system is set up in a way that always benefits the drug industry and only
sporadically benefits public health.
Abbott and Dukes conclude that private civil litigation plays an im-
portant and useful role, not only compensating victims but uncovering
crucial hidden information, especially when pharmaceutical companies
cover up negative data or clinical trial results. This is doubtlessly accu-
81 Press Release (2008), Drug Companies, FDA Lagged in Warning Public About Zetia, Vytorin, Public
Citizen, Jan. 14, available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?lD=2586.
82 Id.
83 Jerry Avorn, Paying for Drug Approvals - Who's Using Whom? 356 (17) New Eng. J. Med. 1697
(2007).
84 Abbott & Dukes, supra note 1, at 213.
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rate, but the real question is whether private litigation is sufficient to ad-
dress these ills. A typical governmental response is that of the House of
Commons when it examined such systemic problems in Britain in 2005.
Noting that "[m]anufacturers are known to have suppressed certain trials
for these drugs in the US and may have done the same in the UK,"85 the
legislative body recommended greater transparency, better communica-
tion, more government funding of research, and similar reforms.86 Given
the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis that any rational company is certain
to perform, can there be any doubt that as long as the pharmaceutical com-
panies remain in a profit-maximizing private industry, they will simply ig-
nore regulation and reform? The problems are ingrained, entrenched, and
intertwined with the core of the industry.
SPECIALIZED POLICY AREAS
A few particular medical policy areas are given attention in one chap-
ter of the book, beginning with vaccines. Interestingly, one big difference
between vaccines and other pharmaceutical products is that in many coun-
tries, vaccine manufacturers are state-owned or non-profit institutes, not
private corporations.87 Blood, too, is treated preferentially, in contrast
with typical medicines. The authors note that "[p]ublic policy requires
that blood and its derivatives be readily available without quality defects
or barriers of price, and there is in many places a preference for non-
commercial supply channels."8 8  Blood is generally not considered a
commercial product because of its human origin, unlike pharmaceutical
products; thus, a government agency or a nonprofit, like the Red Cross,
usually obtains and processes blood.89 So why are vaccines and blood
products treated with such care? They are vital to public health, and soci-
ety has determined that they are above commercialization, not to be re-
duced to the level of other base commodities. The perplexing question,
however, is why the same logic does not apply to other life-saving medi-
cines. Why should HIV or malaria drugs be manufactured privately,
bought and sold on private markets?
Alternative and traditional medicines merit a brief discussion, as well.
85 The House of Commons, The Influence ofthe Pharmaceutical Industry, Health Committee, Fourth Re-
port of Session 2004-05, 4 (London: The Stationery Office Limited, Apr. 5, 2005).
86 Id. at 5.
87 Abbott & Dukes, supra note 1, at 218.
88 Id. at 225.
89 Id. at 226.
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Alternative medical systems, like homeopathy, are complete junk science.
They have no scientific credibility and clinical trials show no evidence that
they work. Yet homeopathy has a large following, so regulatory agencies
have made special provision for licensing homeopathic remedies: basi-
cally, they must be safe even though they have no efficacy, and the label-
ing must make it clear that the drug has not been evaluated for efficacy.90
As long as they are properly informed and warned, consumers are free to
use any of these medicines as they see fit.
Traditional medicines, largely consisting of herbal medicines, in con-
trast, can be extremely valuable; many Western drugs, such as opium,
were discovered because of traditional medical practices.91 The public
policy problem with traditional medicines is that very few systematic stud-
ies or data exist, so they remain unregulated, yet they continue to be
widely used, sometimes with disastrous effects.
This section of the book addresses one last specialized policy area
worth noting: counterfeit medicines. The problem of counterfeit drugs is
enormous, and since "they are disseminated internationally, the problem
can only be solved by coordinated international effort."93 The authors'
logic here is irrefutable, yet their proposed solution is impossible.
Coordinated international effort in a capitalist global economy, di-
vided into nation-states competing for markets, is simply out of the ques-
tion. There is no coordinated international effort on anything: in arms
control, for example, despite agreements like the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, India and Pakistan have ex-
ploded nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era, and other countries like
North Korea and Iran are challenging the current global regime.94 Arms
control law lacks coherent global unity. Similarly, in global warming and
climate change, the recent debacle in Copenhagen is summed up by one
recent news headline: "Copenhagen Climate Conference Ends With
Whim er, No Legally Binding Pact, No Commitment to Pursue One in
2010." Such failed attempts at international cooperation are persuasive
90 Id. at 234.
91 Id. at 234-35.
92 Id. at 235-36.
93 Id. at 245.
94 John Freeman, Is Arms Control Law in Crisis? 9 J. Conflict & Security L. 303, 308 (2004).
95 Major Garrett, Copenhagen Climate Conference Ends With Whimper, No Legally Binding Pact, No
Commitment to Pursue One in 2010, Fox News, White House Blog, Dec. 18, 2009, available at
http://whitehouse.blogs.foxnews.com/2009/12/18/copenhagen-climate-conference-ends-with-whimper-no-
legally-binding-pact-no-commitment-to-pursue-one-in-20 10/.
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evidence that such a goal in the context of pharmaceutical policy is overly
optimistic.
In any case, there are two types of counterfeit drugs: (1) copies of
genuine drugs that are identical to the real ones but merely in breach of
trademark and patent laws, and (2) fake drugs that only superficially re-
semble the real ones and have no medicinal value at all; the latter are dan-
gerous to public health and can severely injure or kill people. 96 The origi-
nator industry has for decades attacked counterfeiting on both fronts, but it
has also tried to prevent generic drug manufacturers from entering their
markets even when it would be perfectly legal, so their efforts in this arena
are properly viewed with skepticism.97
The problem is extremely widespread: while no global surveys of this
problem exist, a survey of Cambodia found that 60 percent of the 133
sampled drug vendors, who were selling an anti-malarial drug, sold either
a highly diluted version or a fake version with no active ingredient at all.98
In fact, the estimated rate of counterfeiting in Southeast Asia is somewhere
between 38 and 53 percent of all medicines.99 This is, of course, an ex-
tremely insidious problem, as people who genuinely need medicines are
receiving substances with little to no therapeutic value at all. The public
health danger here is enormous.
The WHO drew up an extensive report on counterfeit drugs in 1999,
explaining in great detail what many different parties must do at various
levels; moreover, a major international conference on the subject was held
in Rome in 2006. However, despite these things, "there is still little sign
of a truly coordinated global effort" to fix the problem of counterfeit
drugs. 00 Similarly, the authors conclude that an international criminal
court with the power to prosecute drug counterfeiters "does not presently
appear a realistic prospect." 01 The question must be asked: why? The
above discussion about the impossibility of truly coordinated international
effort is unavoidably applicable here, as well. In a competitive global en-
vironment, in which each country attempts to gain markets at the expense
of its neighbors, there can be no truly meaningful cooperation on a global
scale. The authors are absolutely correct to assert that such prospects do
96 Abbott & Dukes, supra note 1, at 246.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 247.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 249.
101 Id.
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not appear to be realistic, but they do not explore the underlying causes.
One final quote from Abbott and Dukes sheds some light on this: they
point out that the "counterfeit movement is fuelled primarily by a dishon-
est urge for enrichment, but it is catalyzed at every level by ignorance, in-
difference or both." 102 While education and the spread of information
would certainly be beneficial in attempting to attack the evils of counter-
feiting drugs, the core problem is, not surprisingly, the drive for profit.
Here, though, it fuels the problem in two different ways: on the one hand,
the individuals and organizations producing the counterfeit drugs are do-
ing so in order to profit. At the same time, however, the lack of any coor-
dinated global response to hunt these people down and stop them from dis-
tributing fake medicines, so injurious to public health, is the inevitable
result of a chaotic, cutthroat system of nation-states each trying to maxi-
mize its own stake in the world's markets and shift any burdens onto oth-
ers. In such a system, any effort at coordinated, strong international action
is inevitably doomed.
THE RICH AND THE POOR
A number of healthcare problems plague wealthy nations. The gap
between the rich and the poor, even in the developed world, can be enor-
mous, particularly in the United States. As a result of this extreme ine-
quality in wealth distribution, many people lack access to medicines. At
the same time, wealthy countries have the reverse problem, as well: the
rich are over-medicating, due to advertising and poor prescribing prac-
tices. 03 This excessive consumption of drugs causes two entirely inde-
pendent problems: it is financially wasteful, but it also endangers public
health. The consequences of over-consumption of drugs for society as a
whole are dramatic, both financially and in terms of public health: as one
example, of the 300 million pounds spent annually in Britain in 1990 on
antibiotics alone, about half this sum was the result of unnecessary pre-
scribing. 05 At the same time, there is a growing antibiotic resistance
worldwide; supply of new, superior antibiotics is diminishing; and multi-
antibiotic resistance is increasingly common. All of this "constitutes an
increasing threat to the world community as a whole."' 06
102 Id. at 250.
103 Id. at 256.
104 Id. at 258.
105 Id. at 259.
106 Id. at 259-60.
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It would be wise to momentarily pause here and reflect on what this
means. The overmedication of the wealthy in industrialized nations is
heavily contributing to the skyrocketing costs of healthcare, if the British
study is any indication. The health implications, though, are even more
disturbing. While overmedication is causing more and more resistance to
antibiotics, the drug companies are at the same time taking the easy route,
tweaking existing drugs and obtaining a patent on something that is only
incrementally better. No fundamental breakthroughs are taking place to
replace the current (soon useless) supply of antibiotics. This spells disas-
ter for humanity, as a disease could easily turn into a full-blown pandemic
at any time, decimating societies across the globe.
The authors recommend increasing drug regulation and education,
such as teaching health professionals about the rational use of medicines,
to curb the growing problem of excessive use of medicines."o Without
even getting into how such measures would be implemented - for educat-
ing both the public and professionals is an expensive undertaking - a more
basic concern is that this would probably not be sufficient. Neither in-
creased regulation nor more widespread education will do anything to in-
crease the rate of innovation of pharmaceutical companies; there will not
be any sudden uptick in their new breakthrough drugs. The lack of inno-
vation is driven by the poorly conceived patent system for drugs combined
with the drive for profit.
Regulation of advertising so that the drug companies would be pro-
hibited from directly promoting their products to consumers, as is the case
in almost all other developed countries, would certainly help curb the
problem of overmedication, but the authors do not explain how such regu-
latory measures are to be enacted. The pharmaceutical industry has a
plethora of lobbyists and is willing to spend astronomical sums of money
in the United States Congress. When the entire legislature is subservient
to the drug industry, who exactly is going to stand up to PhRMA and pass
regulatory reform measures prohibiting direct advertising?
This situation is all the more preposterous given the recent Supreme
Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. In
this landmark decision, the Court abolished long-standing restrictions on
corporate financing of elections under the guise of First Amendment free-
dom of speech, equating corporate money with speech. This, of course, is
107 Id. at 260.
108 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, No. 08-205 (2010).
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patently absurd, and it flies in the face of the Enlightenment principles that
drove the Framers of the Constitution. Jefferson, for example, in a letter to
John Taylor, expressed his view that "banking establishments are more
dangerous than standing armies."1 09 This clearly was not a man who
would have favored allowing banks, or any other large corporations, the
ability to spend unlimited amounts to influence democratic elections.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in 2010 has done just this. What
this means for the pharmaceutical industry (as well as health insurance
companies more broadly) is that the massive power they already wield will
be increased even further. The drug companies were already getting their
way as they pressured Congress in the 1990s into undoing the restrictions
on direct advertising of prescription drugs to consumers. How will any re-
strictive regulation pass in the future, in light of this Supreme Court deci-
sion? While the Court rendered this decision shortly after the authors fin-
ished writing Global Pharmaceutical Policy, it was already an overly
optimistic assumption to rely on Congress to heavily restrict the lucrative
practices of the drug industry. Now it is simply unthinkable.
CONCLUSION
In the conclusion of the book, Abbott and Dukes make it clear that
they wholeheartedly support the free market, even in the context of the
pharmaceutical industry. In fact, they go so far as to claim that "one is
obliged to conclude that the genius of the free market as a whole lies in its
ability to harness the ambition and energy of women and men striving for
wealth, fame, personal satisfaction and other (perhaps more modest) indi-
cia of accomplishment.""o In support of this, the authors point to corpora-
tions' successful management of complex R&D, production and distribu-
tion chains, and assurances of quality, as well as the beneficial relationship
between originators and generic producers.' 11
However, the authors point out a number of distinct flaws, too: the
market provides the biggest rewards for products that people want (or can
be persuaded to want), not for products that address real public health con-
cerns; the increasing consolidation of industry; the risk-averse behavior in
R&D that limits breakthroughs; unreasonable market exclusiv-
109 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in The Works of Thomas Jefferson in
Twelve Volumes (Fed. Ed.), available at The Library of Congress: American Memory,
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/index.html.
I 10 Abbot & Dukes, supra note 1, at 269.
111 Id.
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ity; misleading advertising, on which drug companies spend staggeringly
large amounts of money; generics companies may be bought out or scared
off by litigation; and suppression of data or political pressure obstructs
government regulation and other corrective measures.1 Their conclusion
upon reviewing all these grave problems? "None of these negative aspects
justifies such measures as would tie down the free market excessively, let
alone eliminate it, but they all call for firm correction."1 3
This conclusion does not make sense. The problems they list are real,
and they are critical. Global Pharmaceutical Policy is an excellent re-
source and a fascinating read for an in-depth discussion of many of the
evils in the current state of the pharmaceutical industry. This book is
worth reading for that reason alone; it really delivers when it comes to de-
scribing the industry and the policies we have in place governing that in-
dustry today. Where it falters, however, is in its implications and pro-
posed solutions. While the authors sincerely want to address the problems
that they depict, and some of their solutions would truly be beneficial, they
do not address the root cause: the profit system. Operating in the private
sector, accumulating vast wealth with few restrictions on its behavior, the
pharmaceutical industry puts profit before human life or public health.
This is the cold (and obvious) truth, and this is how things will remain in-
definitely unless the entire system is fundamentally changed, i.e., national-
ized. Nothing short of this will be sufficient.
The authors briefly consider and summarily reject this point of view:
"In the eyes of the critic, the industry has become the epitome of capitalist
greed, grossly overcharging for its products, manipulating the profession
and the public in its own interests, investing much more heavily and suc-
cessfully in seduction than in innovation, economical with the truth and
indifferent to the needs of the developing world." 14 Indeed. Yet the au-
thors disdainfully refer to this view as "too simplistic to be helpful".
This view, though, is exactly correct, and it is from this that we must ex-
trapolate. These evils will not be remedied with meager Congressional re-
form, if that is even possible anymore in the wake of the Citizens United
decision. The drug industry, as always, would simply find ways to get
around the restrictions, or ignore the law and pay relatively small fines for
violating it, or push via lobbyists to get the laws changed in their favor.
112 Id.
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Even the authors point out that corporations, not individuals, may
dominate government because of lobbying efforts. According to the U.S.
Center for Public Integrity, from January 2005 to June 2006, the pharma-
ceutical industry spent $182 million on federal lobbying (in contrast to
very few lobbyists or money spent for consumer and patient interests).116
Not surprisingly, due to the Congressional efforts to pass a health care re-
form bill under President Obama, lobbying has substantially increased in
the past year or two. The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), North-
western University, and the Chicago Tribune conducted a study in De-
cember 2009, finding that health care lobbyists spent $635 million over
the two-year period of 2008-09.117 As the study was finished before 2009
even ended, and given the zealous lobbying in the last quarter of 2009, the
two-year total will come close to, or may even exceed, $1 billion.
Finally, as noted previously, in light of the recent decision in Citizens
United, this quantity of money spent to buy politicians can only be ex-
pected to swell even further, distended like the bloated corpse that the drug
industry has become.
Abbott & Dukes mildly assert that "it seems evident that public policy
in this field must increasingly strike a balance" between the phanraceuti-
cal industry and public health. This timid suggestion will get us no-
where. The drug industry is unbelievably powerful and is gaining more
power every year. It is an inexorable and relentless juggernaut, and at-
tempting meek reforms or striking a balance would be, at best, temporary,
and in any case this would be too little, too late. The only realistic, long-
term, and truly effective solution is to nationalize the entire pharmaceuti-
cal industry. Leaving it in private hands, corporate executives will base
their decisions primarily on what is most profitable, whether beneficial to
or in reckless disregard of public health. Such a system is economically
foolish and morally outrageous. Global pharmaceutical policy should be,
first and foremost, to bring the drug industry under public and democratic
control, with the ruthless motivation of profit replaced by the humane goal
of serving the public health.
116 Id.
117 Andrew Zajac, How health lobbyists influenced reform bill, Chicago Tribune, Dec. 20, 1999.
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